The posts of July 18 and July 19, 2011 discussed the recent Tax Court of Canada decision in Siow v. the Queen. On July 18th, in a blog posting entitled "The CRA Must Prove That A Notice Of Assessment Was Sent", I discussed the finding of the Tax Court that the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) did not prove that the underlying assessments were actually sent to the corporation in respect of which Siow was the sole director. on July 19th, in a blog posting entitled "Director's Liability Provisions in GST/HST Law Is Not Restricted To 4 Year Limitation Period", I discussed the finding of the Tax Court that director's liability assessments do not have an end date for a limitation period, except that a director cannot be assessed after 2 years from the date he/she ceases to be a director.
Siow argued that since the Tax Court had held that the underlying assessment against the corporation was invalid, the corporate debt was nil and, therefore, he should not be assessed even though the limitation period for Siow, as a director, was still open. Siow argued that if the Minister has no rights to proceed against the Corporation for any amount then it must have no rights to proceed against a director of the Corporation assessed under the directors’ liability provisions of the Act; namely section 323 of the Excise Tax Act.
The Tax Court disagreed with Siow. The Tax Court consider principles of statutory interpretation and held:
The clear wording of [subsection 323(1) of the Excise Tax Act] crystallizes a director’s liability to pay the net tax not remitted by the Corporation “at the time the corporation was required to remit or pay, as the case may be, the amount. . .”
The provision makes no reference to any requirement for assessment or that the amount must be related to an assessed amount. The “amount” referenced is clearly the “amount of net tax as required under subsection 228(2)”, applicable here, which subsection requires a registrant to remit net tax. There is no ambiguity in the textual wording of subsection 323(1).
The Tax Court then looked at subsection 299(2) of the Excise Tax Act, which reads as follows:
Liability under this Part to pay or remit any tax, penalty, interest or other amount is not affected by an incorrect or incomplete assessment or by the fact that no assessment has been made.
The Tax Court held that the result following from subsection 299(2) is that tax may be considered to be owing even if a valid assessment has not been issued.
The Tax Court then looked at the federal Court of Appeal decision in Beaupré v. Canada (2005 FCA 168, 2005 G.T.C. 1420 (FCA), Létourneau J.A.) which confirmed that “The tax debt arises not from the assessment but from the Act: . . .”
The Tax Court reviewed other cases and ultimately held:
To make an assessment against the corporation a precondition to proceeding against a director under subsection 323(2) would render subsection 299(2) meaningless, which would be a ridiculous result. Parliament intended such subsection to have meaning and the Appellate Courts have confirmed its application as the basis for a director’s liability. Clearly, the right of the Minister to proceed against a director is not based on a purely derivative action, as supposed by the Appellant’s counsel in argument, but on the basis that due to sections 323 and 299 of the Act, a director is jointly and severally liable for an unremitted amount, regardless of whether there was an assessment against the corporation.
The facts may have been important in bringing the Tax Court to this conclusion. Siow had filed the GST/HST returns for the corporation and had had discussions with the CRA. Siow knew the amounts of the assessments because they were based on GST/HST returns that had been filed and not an arbitrary assessment by the CRA.
In the end, the Tax Court recognized that the effect of the decision in terms of collecting the monies from the director needed to be stated:
Whatever limitations the Minister may have in enforcing collection against a corporation for lack of valid assessment do not limit the Minister in enforcing against a director unless specifically set out in the legislation. The only limitations apparent to me are that the Minister cannot collect more than owed in the first place as subsection 323(6) limits the amount collectable from a director to be the amounts not paid by the corporation, which is clearly a bar against double recovery, itself a principle of natural justice, and the principles of natural justice entitling a director to challenge the underlying amount owing, regardless if assessed against the corporation or not, unless of course a director can successfully argue he or she was assessed more than two years after ceasing to be a director pursuant to the limitation period of subsection 323(5) or has a due diligence defence under subsection 323(4) of the Act, neither of which are applicable here.
It will be interesting to watch whether this case will be appealed.